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Abstract
Introduction: Brazil and Colombia have pursued extensive reforms of their health care systems in the last couple
of decades. The purported goals of such reforms were to improve access, increase efficiency and reduce health
inequities. Notwithstanding their common goals, each country sought a very different pathway to achieve them.
While Brazil attempted to reestablish a greater level of State control through a public national health system,
Colombia embraced market competition under an employer-based social insurance scheme. This work thus aims
to shed some light onto why they pursued divergent strategies and what that has meant in terms of health
outcomes.
Methods: A critical review of the literature concerning equity frameworks, as well as the health care reforms in
Brazil and Colombia was conducted. Then, the shortfall inequality values of crude mortality rate, infant mortality
rate, under-five mortality rate, and life expectancy for the period 1960-2005 were calculated for both countries.
Subsequently, bivariate and multivariate linear regression analyses were performed and controlled for possibly
confounding factors.
Results: When controlling for the underlying historical time trend, both countries appear to have experienced a
deceleration of the pace of improvements in the years following the reforms, for all the variables analyzed. In the case
of Colombia, some of the previous gains in under-five mortality rate and crude mortality rate were, in fact, reversed.
Conclusions: Neither reform seems to have had a decisive positive impact on the health outcomes analyzed for
the defined time period of this research. This, in turn, may be a consequence of both internal characteristics of the
respective reforms and external factors beyond the direct control of health reformers. Among the internal
characteristics: underfunding, unbridled decentralization and inequitable access to care seem to have been the
main constraints. Conversely, international economic adversities, high levels of rural and urban violence, along with
entrenched income inequalities seem to have accounted for the highest burden among external factors.
Keywords: Brazil, Colombia, health care reform, health care system, equity, health inequities, comparative analysis,
health policy
Introduction
Background
Latin America is a vast, heterogeneous land, composed
of a multitude of cultures and traditions. Nevertheless, a
common heritage is sadly persistent: entrenched social
and health inequalities. While in 2005 a child in Cuba
had a better chance of surviving to age 5 than one living
in the United States, a child from Haiti had a worse
chance of reaching the same age than one from Namibia
[1]. On the other hand, while someone born in 2005 in
Costa Rica could expect to live longer than someone
born in Denmark that same year, another one born in
Bolivia could hardly hope to live as long as someone
born in Kazakhstan [1].
Colombia and Brazil, the two most populous countries
of South America, face similar struggles within their
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any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.own borders. Bearing the largest Gini coefficients of the
region: 0.564 (Brazil, 2005) vs. 0.5849 (Colombia, 2006),
their political leaders decided in the late 1980s and early
1990s to attack some of the underlying causes of those
disparities. Many social policies were then instituted.
Among them, two of the most profound and far reach-
ing were the reforms of their health care systems.
Remarkably, despite the fact that such reforms were
initially pursued just 5 years apart from one another,
each country ventured in almost opposite directions.
While Brazil sought to reestablish a greater level of
State control through a public national health system,
Colombia embraced the philosophies of employer-based
social insurance and market competition.
T h ep r e s e n ts t u d yt h u sa i m st os h e ds o m el i g h to n t o
why they pursued different pathways and what that has
meant in terms of health outcomes. Some of the ques-
tions addressed by this work include: A) How effective
have these reforms been in reducing health inequities? B)
How do these reforms compare to one another? C) What
lessons can be learned from the respective reform
processes?
Equity Frameworks
Health inequities have been the subject of a thriving
debate in the last few decades, drawing contributions
from philosophers, economists, social scientists and phy-
sicians alike. Despite the variety of perspectives, they all
seem to stem from the empirical observation that while
the world is now materially richer than in any other
point in known history, thousands continue to suffer
and die every day due to preventable and treatable dis-
eases. Furthermore, the widening gap in health status
between developed countries and developing countries,
as well as between the rich and poor segments of socie-
ties within many countries, seems to invoke a sense that
something is wrong.
Spurred by such troubling thoughts, several bodies of
theories have emerged. Most of them can be grouped
into five categories: utilitarian approaches, communitar-
ian theories, egalitarian theories, libertarian (market-
based) approaches, and deliberative democratic proce-
d u r e s .R a n g i n gt h eg a m u tf r o mc o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t( c o n -
cerned with outcomes) to proceduralistic (concerned
with the process), each set of approaches has its
strengths and weaknesses. In summary, utilitarian the-
ories of health care justice require that resources be
allocated in order to maximize net social utility. It is not
concerned with individual inequities as long as society
as a whole is better off. Communitarian theories express
that there are no universal norms of social justice, but
rather that those are constructed by each society
through a process of social and political evolution.
Under this framework, if a given society values other
goals higher than health, then it has no overarching
responsibility to secure it for its members. Egalitarian
theories embed two different approaches: one sees that
everyone is entitled to the same level of health achieve-
ment while the other believes that everyone is entitle to
equal opportunities of achieving good health. While the
former has a value preference for the outcomes, the lat-
ter values more the means to achieve them. Libertarian
perspectives take a more blatant position: society has
simply no obligation to address social or health inequal-
ities because any measure to do so would imply redistri-
butive policies that ultimately infringe on individual
liberties [2]. Therefore, providing for one’sh e a l t hi sa n
individual responsibility rather than a societal obligation.
Deliberative democratic procedures are defended by
those who believe that by espousing the principles of
autonomy, political equality and due deliberation within
an open public process, justice will prevail. However,
they offer little guidance over what principles of justice
should take precedence over others, if any.
As interesting an exercise as this would be, it is
beyond the scope of the present work to further dissect
the different ethical perspectives. For the motivated
reader who would like to do so, the thorough review
presented in the first chapter of “Health and Social Jus-
tice” [3] is an enlightening journey. Nevertheless, before
we proceed any further, some key issues should be
clarified.
First, it is important to distinguish between inequal-
ities and inequities. Are all health inequalities consid-
ered inequitable? Not necessarily, unless they can be
considered avoidable, unnecessary and unfair [4]. For
instance, the observed higher life expectancy for women
compared to men in developed countries cannot be con-
strued as inequitable if it is due to intrinsic biologic dif-
ferences that are beyond the reach of current social or
medical interventions to overcome it [5]. Conversely,
the observed lower life expectancy for women in many
developing countries can be deemed inequitable if is
due to social policies that discriminate against women.
Such difference is not only inherently unfair, but also
avoidable and unnecessary, for if both men and women
c o u l de q u a l l yb e n e f i tf r o ms o c ietal resources, their life
expectancies would tend to be reversed, as seen in the
developed world.
Second, although it is widely recognized that social
inequities have direct and indirect impacts on health [6],
dealing with them alone is unlikely to produce the high-
est attainable standard of health defined in article 12 of
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights [7]. Moreover, the existence of a univer-
sal health care system, based on fair financing mechan-
isms and quality delivery systems, is seen as an essential
tool to tackle the social determinants of health [8].
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consequentialist and proceduralistic approaches of jus-
tice in health hinders any comprehensive understanding
of the complex nature of health equity. Conceptually,
health equity is a multifaceted praxis. It includes con-
cerns about achievement of health and the capability to
achieve good health [9], not just one or the other. Fortu-
nately, a novel approach has recently emerged as an
attempt to bridge this gap: the health capability para-
digm. Developed by Jennifer Ruger [10], it draws its
core elements from Amartya Sen’s capability framework
[11] but attempts to further specify it to the health field
and provide mechanisms to make it operational.
In essence, the health capability paradigm sees human
flourishing - an Aristotelian concept of good life -a st h e
ultimate human goal. In order to achieve it, one needs
to be able to enjoy some basic capabilities. Ruger argues
that health is one such critical component. Likewise,
health capability entails two essential components:
health functioning and health agency. Health functioning
can be understood as the medical construct of “health”
(physical and mental well-being), while health agency
can be expressed as the “ability to control personal and
professional situations to pursue health.” Thus, health
capabilities represent an individual’s ability to achieve
certain health-related functionings and the freedom to
achieve them [3].
Universal health insurance is paramount to the health
capability paradigm. It requires that the health system
ensures access to medically necessary and medically
appropriate care. Furthermore, it states that health care
resources should be distributed solely on those criteria.
As a result, any discrimination based on the ability to
pay, gender or ethnicity is unacceptable. Thus, the cen-
tral ethical aims of universal health insurance coverage
are to make and keep people healthy, to develop their
health functioning and health agency, as well as enhance
their security by protecting them from the physical and
economic consequences of ill health. This is not to say
that every health intervention must be offered within
this perspective. On the contrary, only those that satisfy
the above medical criteria, and are of high quality,
would be deemed eligible. In addition, when resources
are scarce, as it is almost always the case (especially in
the developing world), preference should be given to
central health capabilities as opposed to non-central
ones (e.g. life-saving interventions vs. cosmetic surgical
procedures). Besides, the design of any package of bene-
fits should be sought through a scientific and delibera-
tive process that includes individuals, physicians and
public health experts in an attempt to reach a reasoned
consensus. Such deliberations will facilitate the develop-
ment of health policy within an institutional arrange-
ment of shared health governance, a modus operandi in
which individuals, providers and institutions work
together to empower individuals and create an environ-
ment enabling all to be healthy [3].
Finally, given the breath of possible approaches inher-
ent in the application of the health capability paradigm
to the analysis of any national health policy, it would be
unfeasible to address all of them simultaneously. There-
fore, it is important to underline that the present work
is limited to the evaluation of the achievement of certain
health functionings, namely: infant mortality rate,
under-five mortality rate, crude mortality rate and life
expectancy. These are intended as proxies of central
health capabilities concerned with avoiding premature
death. Accordingly, intergroup and inter-country differ-
ences in those parameters signal underlying health
inequities that are not being addressed appropriately.
Health Care Reform in Brazil
Pre-Reform Situation
Established under military rule (1964-1985), the old
health care system in Brazil was characterized by a clear
separation of functions between classical Public Health
interventions (e.g. vaccination and disease surveillance),
under the responsibility of the Ministry of Health, and
individual care, which was regulated by the Ministry of
Social Security. Whereas the Ministry of Health (MS, in
Portuguese) saw a decline of its resources from 4.57% of
the federal budget in 1961 to 1.38% in 1980, the Minis-
try of Social Security (MPAS, in Portuguese) gained
ground, funded by compulsory social contributions of
8% of wages of formal sector employees. As a result, it
accounted for more than 90% of all hospitalizations and
outpatient consultations by 1975.
Despite its role as the core of the social insurance
model, the delivery of care was, for the most part, left to
private providers. In fact, the Constitution of 1967
determined that the State had to support the private
sector, and that public provision could only be per-
formed to supplement the role of private providers.
Consequently, by the late 1970s, the health care arm of
the National Institute of Social Security (INPS, in Portu-
guese) had contracted out with 2,300 of the 2,800 hospi-
tals then established in Brazil [12]. Notwithstanding its
increased reach of the urban masses, the system soon
started to fall apart. Dismayed by low reimbursement
rates and payment delays, private providers began in
some cases reneging contracts with INPS, or gaming the
system by either conducting unnecessary procedures
that were better paid or up coding them. Fraud became
the norm rather than the exception. Meanwhile, in the
Public Health arena, malaria continued to scourge the
Amazon region and several epidemic episodes of dengue
and meningitis (in 1971 and 1974) swept the country,
demonstrating the severe budgetary and technical
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coupled with the persecution of any media enterprise
that dared bring such news to the general public.
Alleging better management practices and modern
facilities, private insurers thus emerged as substitutes of
INPS in the formal labor market, filling the vacuum left
by the crumbling public services. Many of those compa-
nies were vertically integrated, similarly to Health Main-
tenance Organizations (HMOs) in the United States.
Not surprisingly, such developments were accompanied
by an increased participation of foreign capital, both in
the insurance and provision markets of the Brazilian
health sector.
In opposition to the forces of privatization, an amal-
gam of social groups united behind a coalition com-
monly referred to as the Sanitary Reform Movement
(SRM). Born out in the Departments of Preventive Med-
icine of Faculties of Medicine, most of which hosted by
public universities, the SRM had a strong commitment
to democratization, decentralization and de-medicaliza-
tion (i.e. promotion of community-based primary care
and opening of clinical practice to health care providers
other than physicians). Supported by the Brazilian
Catholic Church, academic institutions and popular
social movements [13], its greatest challenge was to con-
vince the middle and lower classes that a different
approach was possible. To that end, several pilot pro-
jects were developed across the country as demonstra-
tions of how the public provision of health care services
could be better than what was being offered by INPS
and the private sector.
Foundations of the Reform
Greatly influenced by Marxist theory and Foucault’s
social critique, the Sanitary Movement sought to estab-
lish a new model for the Brazilian health care system,
which was closely related to the perspective of Social
Medicine in vogue in Europe at that time, but adapted
to the complex social and political realities faced in Bra-
zil [13]. As such, it was fiercely egalitarian, supporting
nothing but the full recognition by the State that health
was a universal social right and that it must be provided
equitably [14]. It also incorporated communitarian
notions of local decision-making and resource alloca-
tion, thus the emphasis in decentralization. Moreover, it
saw itself as a civil movement whose ultimate goal was
to promote social justice and move beyond representa-
tional democracy into direct popular participation in
policymaking.
Considering the disquieting centralist legacy of the
military years and the growing dissatisfaction with the
quality of care delivered by INPS and private providers,
t h eS R Mw a sa b l et ob u i l dab r o a dc o a l i t i o ni n t ot h e
debates that eventually culminated in the National Con-
stitutional Assembly of 1987-1988. Conversely, the
struggle to create a publicly-funded national health sys-
tem faced many opponents that thrived in the previous
state of affairs. When competing interests within the
coalition threatened its collapse [15], a compromise was
forged with libertarian forces: a new public Unified
Health System (SUS, in Portuguese) was to be created
integrating all the public provision and regulation of
health care under the auspices of the Ministry of Health.
In exchange, the private system would not only continue
to exist, but wealthy individuals would be able to deduct
a large portion of their premiums and other private
health care expenditures from their federal income tax.
Legal Framing
After more than two decades of dictatorship, the demo-
cratic Brazilian Constitutional Assembly finally defined
health as a right in the National Constitution of 1988.
According to Article 196: “health is a right of all [citi-
zens] and a duty of the State, guaranteed by social and
economic policies aimed at reducing the risk of disease
and providing universal and egalitarian access to actions
and services for its promotion, protection and recovery“
(author’s translation). Article 198 defined that health
care was to be provided by a hierarchical, regionalized
network of services that would constitute the Unified
Health System. Its main principles would be decentrali-
zation, integral care and community participation [16].
Conversely, the Constitution did not specify how this
right would be made operational. For instance, it did
not make it clear how it would be financed, how it
would be organized and managed, or what would be the
duties and responsibilities of the different federative
entities (Union, States and Municipalities).
Thus, a series of federal laws and ordinances were
enacted in the following years to clarify those issues.
Federal Law 8080 of 1990 defined as attributions of
SUS: the delivery of preventive and curative services
(including the provision of pharmaceutical drugs), the
epidemiologic and sanitary surveillance, as well as the
regulation of the entire health care system. It created
the National Health Fund, from which all federal trans-
fers to States and Municipalities would be made. It also
regulated the participation of private providers within
SUS and forbid foreign capital from participating in the
domestic health care market. Federal Law 8142 of 1990
created the framework for social participation within
SUS, by creating health councils in each sphere of gov-
ernment and mandating that half of its composition be
assigned to patient representatives. The Basic Opera-
tional Norm of 1996 (NOB/1996) and the Operational
Norm of Health Assistance of 2001 (NOAS/2001) speci-
fied the duties and responsibilities of each federative
entity and how they would relate to one another. They
also established the mechanisms of the intergovernmen-
tal transfer of resources and the conditions that States
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funds.
In 2000, Constitutional Amendment 29 attempted to
increase the level of public health expenditures by man-
dating minimal budgetary floors for Federal, State and
Municipal health budgets. While State governments
were required to assign 12% of their income to SUS,
Municipal governments were required to assign 15%.
Meanwhile, the Federal government was required to
yearly increase their health budget by the nominal varia-
tion of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Neverthe-
less, the Amendment had a major shortcoming. It did
not define what could be considered as health expendi-
ture. As a result, several state and local governments
included in their health budgets expenses that were pre-
viously assigned elsewhere (e.g. food stamps and health
care for prisoners) in order to meet the new constitu-
tional requirements, instead of incrementing Public
Health activities or improving the delivery of care.
Health System Design
The health system in Brazil is mixed and segmented
i n t ot w os u b s y s t e m s :o n ep u b l i ca n do n ep r i v a t e ,w i t h
separate financing streams. The public subsystem has
two segments: one provides free universal access (all
citizens have the right), f u l l yf i n a n c e db yp u b l i c
resources (general taxes and compulsory payroll taxes),
called the Unified Health System (Sistema Único de
Saúde - SUS, in Portuguese); the other is restricted to
public employees (mainly military and high ranking civil
servants), and it is financed by a traditional social insur-
ance model based on contributions from public employ-
ees and the federal government.
The provision of services in SUS is usually carried out
by public providers under the control of State or Muni-
cipal Health Departments, although it is possible to con-
tract out to private providers. When doing so, laws give
clear preference to other public non-governmental enti-
ties (e.g. universities) and not-for-profit Non-Govern-
mental Organizations (NGOs). Alternatively, for-profit
providers face severe restrictions to provide care under
SUS. Another important aspect of current regulations is
that regardless of who delivers the services, Health
Departments are deemed co-responsible, and therefore
liable, for any malpractice by contractors.
The private subsystem is also comprised of two seg-
ments, both of which benefit from some form of fiscal
incentive: the first is known as the supplementary system
and encompasses several modalities of health insurance.
Participation is voluntary, and it is financed either with
resources from employers and employees (the rates of
contribution are freely negotiated between the parties)
or exclusively by individual families. The second seg-
ment offers direct access to private providers through
out-of-pocket payments [17]. It is worth noting that the
population covered by the private subsystem also bene-
fits from the public network through public health activ-
ities (e.g. vaccination campaigns), and some also use it
for more complex or costly procedures not covered by
their private health insurance policies.
Since 1999, individual health insurance policies are
overseen by the National Agency for Supplementary
Health (ANS, in Portuguese), which has standardized
three types of benefit packages that insurance companies
can offer. The first covers just outpatient care, the sec-
ond inpatient care and emergency services, and the
third covers all of the above. Each package has a
required set of diagnostic and therapeutic procedures
that have to be covered. Insurance companies are free
to define their providers’ network and pricing policies,
but are forbidden from excluding anyone on the basis of
pre-existing conditions (i.e. cream-skimming). They can,
however, deny care for pre-existing conditions for up to
two-years. Furthermore, every year they must request an
authorization from ANS for any increase in premiums.
The main caveat of this legislation is that group insur-
ance policies (i.e. those directly negotiated by employers
on behalf of their employees) are exempt from most of
those requirements, resulting in much greater diversity
of coverage.
Health Care Reform in Colombia
Pre-Reform Situation
The old health care system in Colombia was a three-
tiered system, comprised of a public sector, a social
insurance sector and private insurance. The Public Sec-
tor was publicly provided within the National Health
System (SNS, in Spanish) and financed through general
taxes. It developed considerably between 1975 and 1984,
when it experienced a large increase in the number of
hospitals, health care centers and personnel. However,
the fiscal crisis of 1982 reduced public health care
expenditures from 8% of the national budget to less
than 4% on subsequent years [18]. Besides being under-
funded, the distribution of those scarce resources was
based on historical averages and political pressures, thus
favoring the developed regions of the country. In terms
of coverage, it targeted those who did not participate in
the formal labor market and could not afford to pur-
chase private insurance [19]. It effectively reached 27%
of the population with an additional 28% covered only
partially, exhibiting significant regional differences [18].
The social insurance sector provided coverage to 15%
of the population through the Colombian Social Security
Institute (ICSS, in Spanish), for those employed by the
formal private sector, and the Public Provision Funds
(CPP, in Spanish) for the majority of civil servants. This
was one of the lowest rates in Latin America and the
rate of tax evasion in these segments was fairly high, as
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actually did so [19]. In addition, the armed forces and
some public employees (e.g. public school teachers and
employees of the state oil company), comprising 5% of
the population, had their own social insurance schemes
and network of providers. Finally, only 10% of the
Colombian population could afford private health care.
The rest of the population, about 15%, had no access to
acceptable health services [18].
Foundations of the Reform
Colombia’s health care reform was as much a product of
international influence by actors such as the World Bank
and the Pan American Health Organization as it was part
of a modernizing agenda brought by the national execu-
tive branch. Designed and implement by an external
“change team” [20] harbored at the Ministry of Social
Protection (MSP), which incorporated the former Minis-
try of Health. This change team was composed mostly by
academic economists, many of which had had training
abroad. Their ideological stand closely followed moderni-
zation theories promoted by the World Bank and in
vogue at that time, such as changing the role of the State
in the social sector from provider of services to regulator;
promoting the role of the private sector; increasing effi-
ciency, and using mechanisms other than those histori-
cally used in the delivery of social services, such as
targeting and demand subsidies [20]. By redesigning the
health sector, it sought to overcome the policies of the
previous decades, which, as mentioned above, had built a
fragmented three-tiered system resulting in constrained
access to health services for a large proportion of the
population, operational inefficiencies at all levels of care,
and poor service quality [21].
Legal Framing
The decentralization of the public health sector started
with Decree 77 of 1987 and Law 10 of 1990. In 1993 it
was further emphasized by Law 60 and culminated with
the reform of the entire Social Security System of
Colombia enacted by Law 100. The latter were greatly
influenced by the Constitutional Reform of 1991, which
strongly promoted the decentralization of public services
to sub national levels and ended governmental mono-
poly over public services, including health care [22].
Law 100 changed the organization, financing and deliv-
ery of Colombia’s health care system, mandated the crea-
tion of a new system for the financing and delivery of
health care, allocating public funds directly to individuals
instead of institutions [21], thereby changing classic
social policy from supply-side to demand-side subsidies.
It also established the legal basis for separating the deliv-
ery of services from the financing mechanism by mandat-
ing the separation of public hospitals from the
administrative apparatus of local governments and their
conversion into semi-public entities referred to as State
Social Enterprises (ESEs, in Spanish), allegedly to grant
them the financial and managerial autonomy necessary
to prepare for competition with the private sector under
the new health insurance scheme [21].
Health System Design
Law 100 models individual health care services differ-
ently from traditional Public Health functions. Whereas
the latter are seen as public goods and as such to be
funded by public funds, the former are seen as goods
with intrinsic individual value, for which consumers
would be willing to pay. As such, individual health care
services were reorganized as to become part of a
National Health Insurance (NHI) scheme under a mar-
ket-driven framework, which incorporated principles of
managed competition [23].
The most important mechanisms of managed compe-
tition introduced in Colombia health care model were:
1) the mandate that all workers in the formal sector par-
ticipate of NHI; 2) the existence of one single collecting
fund to each all resources flow to, called the National
Fund of Security and Guarantees (FOSYGA, in Spanish);
3) the establishment of a new payment mechanism to
insurers, through a risk-adjusted capitation system; and
4) the definition of a standardized package of benefits to
be offered to all insurance beneficiaries, called the Man-
datory Health Plan (POS, in Spanish) [23].
Alleging resource constraints, the NHI was in effect
designed as a two-tiered system, composed of the Con-
t r i b u t o r yR e g i m e( C R )a n dt h eS u b s i d i z e dR e g i m e( S R ) .
The CR included all formal sector employees or inde-
pendent workers with ability to pay who were already
enrolled in some form of either private or public insur-
ance, extending coverage to their families. Formal work-
ers were set to contribute an equivalent to 12% of their
salary, of which 4% was to be paid by the employee and
8% by the employer. Independent workers would pay
the full 12% starting from a floor of 2 minimum wages.
The SR targeted the poor and indigent population by
providing subsidies to the insurance premium from spe-
cific public resources and contributions from the CR.
For instance, a percentage point from payroll taxes was
to be channeled to the SR. Tax revenues from several
sources and social investment transfers to municipalities
were also to be earmarked for health. Among these
were new resources from oil revenues and matching
funds by the national government to FOSYGA, the soli-
darity fund [21].
As resources became available, expansion in insurance
coverage for the population eligible for subsidies would
be accompanied by gradual additions to the benefits
package. It was expected that both regimes would have
identical coverage of benefits by 2000, so that a single
universal health insurance system could be implemented
throughout the nation [21]. However, by 2002 the SR
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ing on where they lived) of the standard benefits pack-
age enjoyed by CR enrollees [23].
The delivery of services was to be carried out by both
public and private providers, which would compete
among themselves under the watchful eyes of regulatory
authorities. Nevertheless, due to funding constraints and
cumbersome administrative structures, public hospitals
have lost the upper hand to private providers. Conse-
quently, 14 years later, most of the provision of health
care services in Colombia has been de facto privatized.
Methods
Study Design
Although several different methods have been suggested
to evaluate the performance of health systems [24-26],
and of health care reforms more specifically [27], the
one most consistent with cross-country comparisons of
inequities in health capabilities is the measurement of
shortfall inequalities [3]. At the national level, such mea-
sures can assess quantitatively how much a given society
has realized its health potential and how much remains
unrealized, because they compare the actual achieve-
ment of a given health system with the optimal average
value of a given reference group [3]. If the objective of
the study is to understand domestic inequities than the
reference group shall be the segment of the population
who presents the highest achievement. For international
comparisons, the best performing country for a given
indicator shall be used as the reference. This allows for
both methodological flexibility and consistency. For
those reasons, this is the standard adopted by this work.
Data
The data for outcome variables was drawn from
BADEINSO, a cross-national database of social indica-
tors produced by the Economic Commission for Latin
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) [28]. It contains
23 different indicators, for 35 countries (including semi-
independent territories), covering the period of 1960-
2007. The data for the control variables were drawn
from WDI (World Development Indicators), a cross-
national database produced by the World Bank [1]. It
contains more than 800 economic and socio-economic
indicators for 209 countries, covering the same time-
period as that of BADEINSO. According to ECLAC and
the World Bank, data included in those databases con-
form as much as possible to the United Nations System
of National Accounts (SNA) and the methods of specia-
lized U.N. agencies (e.g. WHO and UNICEF). Despite
their breadth, a crucial issue with both databases is the
prevalence of insidious gaps in the data, most noticeably
for series earlier than 1990, which posed some statistical
challenges and limited the scope of this analysis.
Measures
The four primary outcome measures (dependent vari-
ables) in this study were crude mortality rate (CMR -
the number of deaths in a given year divided by 1,000
inhabitants), infant mortality rate (IMR - the number of
deaths of children less than 1 year old per 1,000 live
births), under-five mortality rate (U5MR - the number
of deaths of children less than 5 years old per 1,000 live
births), and life expectancy at birth (LEXP - the
expected average life-span measured in years). The main
control variables were gross domestic product (GDP)
per capita, converted to constant 2000 U.S. dollars), fer-
tility rate (number of births per woman), population
growth (annual percentage of growth) and rural popula-
tion (percentage of the population living in rural areas).
The first step in this analysis was to decide what would
be time interval used to evaluate the time series. Con-
sidering several gaps in the data, a 5-year interval was
chosen, covering the period 1960-2005. Subsequently,
when data for any specific time point was missing, the
respective value was estimated from a five-year average
of adjacent years. As a result, a total of 10 observations
for each country were obtained for each variable.
The second set of outcome variables (ABSSI_CMR,
ABSSI_IMR, ABSSI_U5MR, and ABSSI_LEXP) was cal-
culated by comparing the actual value of the original
indicators for each of the two countries against the opti-
mal average value for Latin America and the Caribbean
in order to obtain the absolute shortfall inequality for
each country in each given time period, using the fol-
lowing equation: SIx =|X optimal -X actual | ,w h e r eX
represents the value of the indicator being analyzed in
each given year of the time series.
Finally, in order to evaluate the reform, two dummy
variables were created. The first one was created to
represent whether any given time point was either
before or after (pre/post) the health care reforms. The
second one was created to represent how many years
had elapsed since the reforms. The years in which the
major legislative changes were enacted (1988 and 1993,
respectively for Brazil and Colombia) were defined as
the break points for each country time series.
Graphical Analysis
For each outcome variable, the time-series values for
Brazil and Colombia were plotted against the optimal
average value for the region (Latin America and the
Caribbean).
Statistical Analysis
Overall characteristics of each variable were assessed by
univariate analysis. Subsequently, control variables were
tested for correlation. High values (greater than 95%)
were found among them. As a result, GDP per capita
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the multivariate models in order to avoid multicollinear-
ity. Bivariate analysis examined unadjusted relationships
between the outcome variables and the overall time
trend as well as the reform. Bivariate correlations were
analyzed with the t-test. The null hypothesis in all the
tests was that the health care reforms had no impact in
the reduction of health inequities, whether analyzed
separately for each country or when compared to the
optimal regional average value (in terms of the shortfall
inequality).
Multivariate analyses were performed using ordinary
least square regression. Separate sets of models were
used for each country (Brazil and Colombia), for each
outcome (dependent) variable. To test for a change
point difference (i.e. to see the impact of the reforms in
each outcome variable), two approaches were used. The
first approach was to fit models which included the year
span and the second reform dummy, in order to assess
the impact of the reform while controlling for the over-
all time trend. Subsequently, this initial model served as
the basis for another model, which included the variable
GDP per capita to also control for economic develop-
ment. The second approach was to perform predictive
Chow tests in all of the above models, in order to test
for structural change by evaluating whether the coeffi-
cients in the regression model were the same in the
separate subsamples (pre/post reform).
As expected by the nature of time-series analysis, two
of the dependent variables (IMR and U5MR) presented
second-order lag influence in the linear regressions of
the Brazilian data using the first set of models (time
trend + reform). Accordingly, new estimates were
obtained by correcting for the autoregressive para-
meters. No other adjustments were made. Multivariate
linear regressions were validated using adjusted-R
2 and
partial-F tests. Two-tailed p-values are reported for all
analyses. All statistical analyses were performed using
SAS
® and Microsoft Excel
®.
Results
Crude Mortality Rate
The graphic analysis of the time-series trend data for
crude mortality rate shown in Figure 1 demonstrates
that both countries succeeded in reducing their respec-
tive rates, but that the reduction of the shortfall inequal-
ity fluctuated considerably and slowed down after 1985
for Colombia and 1990 for Brazil.
The bivariate analyses of the baseline values of crude
mortality rate showed a persistent, and similar, trend of
reduction in this rate for both Brazil (-0.16893 per year)
and Colombia (-0.16183 per year). The predictive Chow
test also confirmed that a break in the time-series
seemed in fact to have happened at the time each one
of the reforms was enacted. Indeed, the average crude
mortality rates for the post-reform periods were 4.01080
units smaller for Brazil and 3.20810 units smaller for
Colombia.
However, the multivariate analyses of the baseline
values pointed out in the opposite direction. Indeed,
when the effect of the reform was controlled for the
underlying time trend, for each year that followed the
enactment of the reforms, the pace of reduction of the
crude mortality rate was either slowed down in the case
of Brazil, or nearly reversed in the case of Colombia.
Both results were statistically significant at p = 0.0004
and p = 0.0059, respectively for Brazil and Colombia.
The pattern persisted even when the influence of GDP
per capita was factored in, as shown in Table 1.
Likewise, Table 2 shows a pattern similar to what was
observed with the baseline values. While the bivariate
analyses appear to demonstrate an important effect of
both the time trends and the reforms in reducing the
shortfall inequality in the crude mortality rate, the mul-
tivariate analyses that control for the underlying time
trend pointed out in the opposite direction: that the
years after the reforms either reduced the pace of the
improvement in the crude mortality rate or upturned
previous gains. Once more, the effect on Colombia
seems to have been more deleterious than in Brazil.
Infant Mortality Rate
The graphic analysis of the time-series trend data for
infant mortality rate shown in Figure 2 demonstrates
that both countries succeeded in reducing their respec-
tive rates, but that the reduction of the shortfall inequal-
ity was proportionally more intense in Brazil than in
Colombia, although Colombia has always maintained a
lower rate.
Figure 1 Crude Mortality Rate (Shortfall Inequality) Time-Series
trend data of Crude Mortality Rate for Brazil and Colombia.
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mortality rate showed a much steeper trend of reduction
in this rate than in the crude mortality rate, both for
both Brazil (-2.52848 per year) and Colombia (-1.42364
per year). The predictive Chow test suggested that a
break in the time-series seemed to have happened at the
time the reform was enacted in Brazil but not so in
Colombia. Nevertheless, the average infant mortality
rates for the post-reform periods were both substantially
smaller: -61.66667 in Brazil and -30.88095 in Colombia.
The multivariate analyses of the baseline values
pointed out that such gain might not have been due to
the reforms. Instead, the original time trend seems to
have remained the main driver, even after the reforms
were enacted. In fact, when that effect was controlled
for, each subsequent year after the reforms saw the
slowdown of the reduction of the infant mortality rate
in both countries. Nonetheless, the downturn in Brazil
seems to have been less pronounced than in Colombia
(1.19610 vs. 1.54147). Both results were statistically sig-
nificant at p < 0.0001 and p = 0.0164, respectively. As
shown in Table 3 such pattern did not change substan-
tively when GDP per capita was also controlled for.
When shortfall inequalities were considered (Table 4),
any positive effect the reforms might have had in redu-
cing the infant mortality rate seem to have been further
attenuated. For instance, predictive Chow tests were
unable to distinguish any statistically significant break
point in the overall time trend, meaning the reforms did
not seem to have had any impact in the reduction of
the shortfall inequalities throughout the analyzed period,
not even in Brazil where the predictive Chow test was
statistically significant for the time trend in the baseline
values. Similarly, the multivariate analyses that control
Table 1 Crude Mortality Rate: Baseline Values
Brazil Colombia
Parameter
Estimate
p-
value
Adjusted
R
2
Predictive
Chow
Parameter
Estimate
p-
value
Adjusted
R
2
Predictive
Chow
Bivariate Analyses
Time Trend -0.1686 < .0001 0.9375 0.0434 -0.1618 < .0001 0.8797 0.0193
Reform -4.0108 0.0067 0.6217 0.9872 -3.2081 0.0680 0.2770 0.9701
Multivariate
Analyses
1st model 0.9895 0.9620 0.9567 0.3734
Time Trend -0.2244 < .0001 -0.2134 < .0001
plus Reform Years 0.1655 0.0004 0.2545 0.0059
2nd model 0.9882 0.9818 0.9576 0.5652
Time Trend -0.2107 0.0005 -0.3174 0.0180
plus Reform Years 0.1533 0.0068 0.3059 0.0089
plus GDP per capita -0.0002 0.6577 0.0032 0.3240
Table 2 Crude Mortality Rate: Shortfall Inequality
Brazil Colombia
Parameter
Estimate
p-
value
Adjusted
R
2
Predictive
Chow
Parameter
Estimate
p-
value
Adjusted
R
2
Predictive
Chow
Bivariate Analyses
Time Trend -0.1099 < .0001 0.8874 0.0835 -0.1031 0.0005 0.7728 0.0356
Reform -2.5392 0.0129 0.5043 0.9988 -1.8062 0.1415 0.1557 0.9928
Multivariate
Analyses
1st model 0.9725 0.8765 0.9012 0.4298
Time Trend -0.1578 < .0001 -0.1484 < .0001
plus Reform Years 0.1424 0.0014 0.2242 0.0118
2nd model 0.9871 0.6003 0.8868 0.5130
Time Trend -0.0963 0.0046 -0.1838 0.1406
plus Reform Years 0.0877 0.0161 0.2416 0.0341
plus GDP per capita -0.0008 0.0242 0.0011 0.7511
Esteves International Journal for Equity in Health 2012, 11:6
http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/11/1/6
Page 9 of 16for the underlying time trend and GDP per capita indi-
cated that the reforms did not alter the processes that
had already been set into motion before them.
Under-Five Mortality Rate
The graphic analysis of the time-series trend data for
under-five mortality rate shown in Figure 3 exhibits a
similar layout as the one for infant mortality rate. Con-
sidering that under-five mortality rate encompasses the
infant mortality rate, such outlook is hardly a surprise.
On the other hand, what was unanticipated was the fact
that the gap between Brazil and Colombia seems to be
c l o s i n ge v e nf a s t e rt h a ni nt h ec a s eo fi n f a n tm o r t a l i t y
rate. If the current outline holds, Brazil may soon have a
lower rate than Colombia.
The bivariate analyses of the baseline values of under-
five mortality rate exhibited as l i g h t l yg r e a t e rt r e n do f
r e d u c t i o ni nt h i sr a t et h a ni nt h ei n f a n tm o r t a l i t yr a t e ,
both for both Brazil (-3.47515 per year) and Colombia
(-2.46303 per year). Results from the predictive Chow test
once again implied the presence of a significant break in
the Brazilian time-series but not the Colombian. Nonethe-
less, the average under-five mortality rates for the post-
reform periods were substantially reduced in both coun-
tries: -84.50000 in Brazil and -52.09524 in Colombia.
The multivariate analyses of the baseline values
pointed out that such improvement was slowed down in
the years after the reform, to the point of nearly rever-
sing the trend in Colombia (time trend: -3.10686
/reform years: 3.18061). Both results were statistically
significant at p < 0.0001 and p = 0.0095, respectively. As
shown in Table 5 such pattern did not change substan-
tively when controlled for GDP per capita.
When shortfall inequalities were evaluated (Table 6),
the bivariate analyses pointed out that the positive impact
of the reforms were smaller than what was originally sug-
gested by the analysis of the baseline values. The multi-
variate analyses only made that distinction clearer. In the
context of Brazil, every year after the reform seem to
have marginally negated the effect of the underlying time
trend (an increase of 0.57245 i nt h ei n e q u a l i t yv s .a
decrease of 2.63532), although not statistically significant.
More startling was the impact in Colombia, where reform
years increased the shortfall inequality by 1.66040 a year
(p = 0.0134), all but erasing the progress represented by
the underlying trend of -1.76641 (p<. 0 0 0 1 ). The intro-
duction of GDP per capita into the model produced no
significant changes in the analysis.
Life Expectancy
The graphic analysis of the time-series trend data for life
expectancy shown in Figure 4 demonstrates that both
Figure 2 Infant Mortality Rate (Shortfall Inequality) Time-Series
trend data of Infant Mortality Rate for Brazil and Colombia.
Table 3 Infant Mortality Rate: Baseline Values
Brazil Colombia
Parameter
Estimate
p-
value
Adjusted
R
2
Predictive
Chow
Parameter
Estimate
p-
value
Adjusted
R
2
Predictive
Chow
Bivariate Analyses
Time Trend -2.5285 < .0001 0.9861 0.0041 -1.4236 < .0001 0.9298 0.1073
Reform -61.6667 0.0032 0.6441 0.9573 -30.8810 0.0339 0.0339 0.9938
Multivariate
Analyses
1st model 0.9985 0.4627 0.9667 0.7786
Time Trend -2.9222 < .0001 -1.7357 < .0001
plus Reform Years 1.1961 < .0001 1.5415 0.0164
2nd model 0.9987 0.3530 0.9624 0.5453
Time Trend -2.7148 < .0001 -1.3746 0.1347
plus Reform Years 0.9895 0.0018 1.3631 0.0805
plus GDP per capita -0.0026 0.1978 -0.0112 0.6608
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span of their populations. Also perceptible is the appar-
ent leveling off of the rate of improvement in Colombia
since 1990, in the 68-71 range. On the other hand, Bra-
zil seems to be maintaining a fairly linear rate of
improvement and might soon outpace Colombia. Still,
both countries loom distant from the optimal value in
Latin America and the Caribbean.
The bivariate analyses of the baseline values of life
expectancy confirm the expectations geared from Figure
4. In other words, both countries have consistently
improved the life expectancies of their populations,
although Brazil seems to have advanced at a somewhat
higher rate than Colombia (0.38764 year gained per
calendar year vs. 0.36424), which justifies their near tie
in 2005. Accordingly, the predictive Chow test for the
time trend was statistically significant only for Colombia,
meaning that the break point represented by the
reforms was not observed in Brazil. Unfortunately, that
was not necessarily a positive outcome, quite the
opposite.
A st h em u l t i v a r i a t ea n a l y s e ss h o w e di nT a b l e7t h e
rate of the improvement in life expectancy was more
than halved (-0.23368 per year; p = 0.0090) in the years
after the reform in Colombia. Conversely, such period
in Brazil produce only a non-statistically-significant (p=
0.0678) reduction of -0.03861 per year. No significant
additional effect was observed when GDP per capita was
included in the model.
When shortfall inequalities were evaluated (Table 8),
the bivariate analyses showed that the negative impact
seen in the years after the reform was even more dra-
matic for Colombia. Furthermore, the multivariate ana-
lyses demonstrated that instead of getting smaller,
shortfall inequalities in life expectancy actually grew an
average of 0.21585 per year, overriding the underlying
reductionist time trend of -0.19078 per year. In the case
of Brazil, no statistically significant change was observed
i nt h em u l t i v a r i a t ea n a l y s i s ,e x c e p tf o rt h et i m et r e n d ,
which was significant in both multivariate models (p<
.0001). The introduction of GDP per capita into the
model only produced significant changes in the analysis
of the Colombian time-series, where it also acted against
the reduction of the shortfall inequalities in life
expectancy.
Discussion
Many countries in Latin America have undergone sub-
stantial reforms of their health care systems in the last
twenty years. Measuring their impact on health out-
comes is crucial to understand how effective they have
Table 4 Infant Mortality Rate: Shortfall Inequality
Brazil Colombia
Parameter
Estimate
p-
value
Adjusted
R
2
Predictive
Chow
Parameter
Estimate
p-
value
Adjusted
R
2
Predictive
Chow
Bivariate Analyses
Time Trend -1.6861 < .0001 0.9861 0.8711 -0.5812 < .0001 0.9515 0.3601
Reform -43.0000 0.0012 0.7159 0.8860 -13.2143 0.0215 0.4416 0.9867
Multivariate
Analyses
1st model 0.9847 0.9320 0.9654 0.9120
Time Trend -1.7376 < .0001 -0.6653 < .0001
plus Reform Years 0.1528 0.6338 0.4154 0.0792
2nd model 0.9894 0.9859 0.9606 0.9508
Time Trend -2.2924 0.0002 -0.7879 0.0539
plus Reform Years 0.6455 0.1165 0.4759 0.1271
plus GDP per capita 0.0069 0.0886 0.0038 0.7183
Figure 3 Under-Five Mortality Rate (Shortfall Inequality) Time-
Series trend data of Under-Five Mortality Rate for Brazil and
Colombia.
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ing better access to health care services, financial secur-
ity and reducing health inequities. To this date, most
evaluations [23,31,32] of those reforms have been lim-
ited to single country analyses based on national cross-
sectional data. The disadvantage of such methodology is
that it does not adequately control for existing underly-
ing time trends present in the variables of interest at the
time the reforms were enacted. Furthermore, compari-
sons between countries are difficult to assess based on
those individual studies since they often entail different
variable definitions, different time periods and survey
methods.
The present work thus attempted to redress those
issues by utilizing internationally standardized time ser-
ies data for Brazil and Colombia, covering the period
from 1960 to 2005. Another innovation introduced by
this study was that it is the first to compare the achieve-
ments in health functioning for Brazil and Colombia
within the context of the health capability paradigm [3].
As a result, not only did it analyze their individual per-
formances in the four health outcomes of interest (crude
mortality rate, infant mortality rate, under-five mortality
rate and life expectancy), but also assessed their success
in reducing the shortfall inequalities in those variables
when measured against the corresponding optimal
values in Latin America and the Caribbean.
The results of the analyses of the baseline values of
each country showed that while both of them succeeded
in improving those indicators throughout the time per-
iod of the analysis, the impact of their health care
reforms was much less tangible. In fact, in most cases
they were not able to alter the underlying time trend
already in place when the reforms were enacted.
Table 5 Under-Five Mortality Rate: Baseline Values
Brazil Colombia
Parameter
Estimate
p-
value
Adjusted
R
2
Predictive
Chow
Parameter
Estimate
p-
value
Adjusted
R
2
Predictive
Chow
Bivariate Analyses
Time Trend -3.4752 < .0001 0.9806 0.0026 -2.4630 < .0001 0.9107 0.0711
Reform -84.5000 0.0035 0.6357 0.9691 -52.0952 0.0429 0.3467
Multivariate
Analyses
1st model 0.9984 0.5178 0.9633 0.7484
Time Trend -4.1248 < .0001 -3.1069 < .0001
plus Reform Years 1.9478 < .0001 3.1806 0.0095
2nd model 0.9987 0.3387 0.9587 0.5262
Time Trend -3.8282 < .0001 -2.4524 0.1433
plus Reform Years 1.6747 0.0006 2.8573 0.0531
plus GDP per capita -0.0037 0.1799 -0.0203 0.6640
Table 6 Under-Five Mortality Rate: Shortfall Inequality
Brazil Colombia
Parameter
Estimate
p-
value
Adjusted
R
2
Predictive
Chow
Parameter
Estimate
p-
value
Adjusted
R
2
Predictive
Chow
Bivariate Analyses
Time Trend -2.4424 < .0001 0.9901 0.4296 -1.4303 < .0001 0.9228 0.1012
Reform -61.6667 0.0015 0.7022 0.9265 -30.8571 0.0361 0.3715 0.9972
Multivariate
Analyses
1st model 0.9924 0.8195 0.9652 0.8098
Time Trend -2.6353 < .0001 -1.7664 < .0001
plus Reform Years 0.5725 0.1100 1.6604 0.0134
2nd model 0.9942 0.9371 0.9599 0.7290
Time Trend -3.1588 < .0001 -1.5472 0.1109
plus Reform Years 1.0373 0.0330 1.5521 0.0614
plus GDP per capita 0.0065 0.1232 -0.0068 0.7969
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outline was inevitably negative. In other words, the years
after the reform often saw the deceleration of the pace of
improvements in both countries for all the variables ana-
lyzed. This effect was even more pronounced in Colom-
bia, where some of the previous gains in the under-five
mortality rate and the crude mortality rate were
reversed.
The subsequent analyses of the shortfall inequalities
further aggravated the perception that the health care
reforms of Brazil and Colombia did not contribute to
the reduction of heath inequities. When controlling for
the underlying time trend, neither reform produced a
statistically significant positive contribution to any of
the variables studied. On the contrary, their respective
impacts were often counterproductive. Consistent with
the above results, Colombia fared once again worse than
Brazil. In fact, both in life expectancy and crude mortal-
ity rate the average measured effect of the reform years
overturned the historical time trend and effectively
increased shortfall inequalities among those variables.
Also worth noticing is the fact that GDP per capita,
used as a control in the second model of the multivari-
ate linear regressions, only had a statistically significant
impact in two of them, namely: shortfall inequality of
crude mortality rate in Brazil (p = 0.0242)a n ds h o r t f a l l
inequality of life expectancy in Colombia (p = 0.0262).
When it did so, its influence was to increase the
inequities.
Given the public praise received by both reforms from
domestic [22,31,33,34] and international [8,17,35] obser-
vers in recent years, the findings of this study seem
counterintuitive. How can this be true? First, most pre-
vious studies did not explicitly control for the effect of
the historical time trend on results measured after the
reform. Second, when they did control, it was within a
differences-in-differences design for pooled cross-sec-
tional data, often with just one pre-reform time period
and one post-reform time period. Third, nearly all of
them used national data, some of which might not have
been adjusted to international standards, making cross-
country comparisons much more difficult. Fourth, none
of them measured the reforms of Brazil and Colombia
against an independent third-party reference value in
order to assess the effective reduction of the gap
between their current achievements and the optimal
international average (i.e. shortfall inequality) for the
region.
Still, the present work has some limitations that must
be acknowledged. First, the scarcity of internationally
standardized data for health outcomes, especially for
time points before 1990, severely restricted the diversity
Figure 4 Life Expectancy (Shortfall Inequality) Time-Series trend
data of Life Expectancy for Brazil and Colombia.
Table 7 Life Expectancy: Baseline Values
Brazil Colombia
Parameter
Estimate
p-
value
Adjusted
R
2
Predictive
Chow
Parameter
Estimate
p-
value
Adjusted
R
2
Predictive
Chow
Bivariate Analyses
Time Trend 0.3876 < .0001 0.9985 0.4545 0.3642 < .0001 0.9768 0.0135
Reform 9.6167 0.0020 0.6797 0.8684 8.2714 0.0196 0.4535 0.9528
Multivariate
Analyses
1st model 0.9990 0.7540 0.9906 0.1989
Time Trend 0.4007 < .0001 0.4116 < .0001
plus Reform Years -0.0386 0.0678 -0.2337 0.0090
2nd model 0.9988 0.8433 0.9937 0.1805
Time Trend 0.4012 < .0001 0.5810 0.0004
plus Reform Years -0.0391 0.1927 -0.3174 0.0030
plus GDP per capita 0.0000 0.9792 -0.0053 0.0782
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iting the scope of this study to the four health outcomes
mentioned earlier. Second, because of such scarcity, a 5-
year interval between data points had to be observed
rather than an annual or semester basis, thereby increas-
ing the influence of each individual data point in the
overall fit of the regression s .T h i r d ,b e c a u s eo fg a p si n
the dataset a few data points had to be estimated from
5-year averages, increasing standard errors and reducing
the likelihood of statistically significant results. Fourth,
the cut point of this study was set for 2005, when the
Brazilian health care reform had been established for
just over 15 years while the Colombian reform had little
more than 10 years, both of which might be too short
to comprehensively evaluate their long-term effects.
Fifth, despite the efforts of ECLAC and the World Bank
to standardize the data across countries, differences in
methods and definitions might still account for some of
the variability observed in the results of this study.
Sixth, the attempt to control for the underlying histori-
cal trends assumes that such trends would remain con-
stant in the years after the reforms were enacted, which
does not account for countries’ susceptibility to unfore-
seen economic shocks and social upheavals. Seventh, in
the absence of health care reforms, it is possible that
historical trends might not have remained constant
throughout the time-series, given the potential plateau
effect related to the ability to maintain constant changes
as levels of performance rise, such as when outcomes
improve.
In spite of such limitations, the high adjusted-R
2 of
most of the models and their consistent pattern across
the four studied variables suggest that the impact of the
health care reforms in Brazil and Colombia was not
nearly as positive as expected. Why? Some of the
answers might lie outside the realm of the health care
system while others could be nested in the heart of the
design of each health care reform.
Within the realm of health care reforms, some fea-
tures are likely culprits. For instance, in both Brazil and
Colombia insufficient funding is likely to have slowed
the implementation of new services that could have
helped alleviated suffering populations. By extension, the
overt emphasis on decentralization might have led to
the disruption of previously functional vertical programs
aimed at child survival, which in turn might have
adversely effected the infant and under-five mortality
rates. In the case of Colombia, the explicit tiering of the
social insurance model into a contributory regime and a
subsidized regime with distinct packages of benefits
might have crystallized health inequities due to uneven
access to care. Furthermore, such an arrangement is
inherently unfair according to the health capability para-
digm [3], as it denies equal access to high-quality care,
an essential requirement in order to secure the achieve-
ment of central health capabilities. Moreover, the latest
ruling of the Colombian Constitutional Court stroke
down the two-tiered system, considering it unconstitu-
tional and demanding a complete overhaul by 2010. On
the other hand, although the Brazilian public health care
system (SUS) is nominally universal and every citizen is
entitled to comprehensive care, high regional inequities
in access remain [36], thereby perpetuating long-lasting
health disparities, which in turn hinder progress in the
outcomes analyzed by this study. For instance, a recent
study [37] presents a thorough analysis of sub-national
inequalities in Brazil for under-five mortality rates and
neonatal mortality rates which demonstrates that, in
general, the Brazilian health care reform has been much
more effective in improving rates in the better off than
Table 8 Life Expectancy: Shortfall Inequality
Brazil Colombia
Parameter
Estimate
p-
value
Adjusted
R
2
Predictive
Chow
Parameter
Estimate
p-
value
Adjusted
R
2
Predictive
Chow
Bivariate Analyses
Time Trend -0.1705 < .0001 0.9930 0.4811 -0.1471 < .0001 0.8923 0.0259
Reform -4.3358 0.0012 0.7164 0.8452 -2.9795 0.0586 0.3000 0.9589
Multivariate
Analyses
1st model 0.9923 0.1140 0.9599 0.2800
Time Trend -0.1747 < .0001 -0.1908 < .0001
plus Reform Years 0.0126 0.5820 0.2159 0.0066
2nd model 0.9942 0.1891 0.9808 0.1314
Time Trend -0.2115 < .0001 -0.3634 0.0009
plus Reform Years 0.0452 0.1356 0.3011 0.0008
plus GDP per capita 0.0005 0.1214 0.0054 0.0262
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cases, this has led to widening poor/rich gaps.
Outside the health sector, both countries have
endured imposing challenges .I nt h ee c o n o m i ca r e n a ,
the currency crises in Russia, Mexico and Southeast
Asia that happened in the 1990’s severely battered the
overall economic stability of both countries. In this
regard, Colombia seems to have suffered the most, since
its economy is more dependent on the external market
than the Brazilian economy. The graphs seem to corro-
borate this hypothesis, as a drastic slowdown in the rate
of reduction of infant and under-five mortality rate
starting at 1990 is unmistakable for Colombia but not as
meaningful for Brazil. In addition, Colombia has been
embattled in a fierce fight against domestic insurgent
groups, particularly after 1990, with likely adverse effects
in its crude mortality rate and life expectancy. Likewise,
Brazil has also had to grasp with growing urban violence
since 1995, possibly resulting in a slowdown of any pro-
gress in the reduction of its crude mortality rate. Never-
theless, no significant impact of this problem has yet
been noticed in Brazil’s life expectancy, perhaps because
its effect might take longer to accrue. Another relevant
aspect of the social and political scenario of both coun-
tries that is likely to be thwarting progress in health
capabilities is the high level of income inequalities, as
described by Gini coefficients of 0.569 for Brazil (2004)
and 0.563 for Colombia (2003).
Conclusions
This study has found that the health care reforms of the
late 1980s in Brazil and early 1990s in Colombia do not
seem to have had a positive impact in improving the
crude mortality rate, the infant mortality rate, the
under-five mortality rate or life expectancy when con-
trolled for the underlying historical time trend. On the
contrary, for all studied variables, the progress that
otherwise would have been expected appeared to have
been deterred in the years after the reforms were
enacted. In the case of Colombia, such deterrence all
b u to v e r t u r n e dp r e v i o u sa c h i e v e m e n t s .T h er e a s o n sf o r
such failures are likely to be related both to the specific
design of the reforms themselves, as well as external fac-
tors. Underfunding, unbridled decentralization, and
inequitable access to care seem to be the main drivers
among the former. Concerning the latter, the major
impediments might have come from economic adversi-
ties, high levels of rural and urban violence, along with
entrenched income inequalities.
Fortunately, governments in both countries seem to
have awakened from those problems and have recently
proposed measures to correct the flaws in the design
and implementation of their respective health care
reforms [36,38]. Nevertheless, further research needs to
be done to measure the specific contribution of each
one of the factors mentioned above in order to assist in
the development of evidence-based health policy. More-
over, a systematic approach of monitoring and evalua-
tion, especially standardized data collection, is of
paramount importance. Neither individual countries nor
international organizations can shy away from such
commitments anymore. As Julio Frenk once noted: “to
reform we need to inform, otherwise one is likely to
deform” [39].
Likewise, in order to be able to inform, policymakers
need evidence of what type of policy works best in each
circumstance and what to expect from them. The aim
of the present work was precisely to help fill this gap. I
believe the results of this study can shed some light into
the shady corners of health care reforms and further
advance the quest for equity in Latin America.
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